The Fall of Bakhtíyár Khiljí

A man who is sickened with grief, surrounded by depression, a man who is languishing in his own pathetic misery. A man who is too ashamed to come out of his room! Surely, one should feel sorry for any such creature and pity his situation, right? But that doesn’t always happen. For empathy is an emotion that is not absolute. It is relative and it corresponds to what we know about that person, what he had done to evoke those pathos.

Do we feel sympathy for a person who has been an underling of those who invaded our motherland, has contributed to the establishment of one of the most cruel and barbaric state ever to have existed in India, nay, the world – the Delhi Sultanate. His own contribution includes violent extermination of many temples of wisdom, many ancient universities of our country, turning centuries of knowledge to ashes, massacre of the innocents, slaying of the monks, uprooting our native kingdoms and butchering the general population whose only fault was their sheer existence.

What we then feel is nothing but a sense of content, albeit a hollow one, for those who had perished – be it the monuments or our fellow countrymen, would never come back. Who was this man and how he came to be in such a situation? And how his end came to be? The man was Ikhtiyár-ud dín Muhammad Bakhtíyár Khiljí and this is the account of his foolhardy campaign to conquer Tibet and the courageous reprisal by the Tibetans. This is the account of an attack by our own countrymen from the land of Kámarúpa i.e. Assam that ultimately became the end of Bakhtíyár’s army.

Background

Bakhtíyár Khiljí of Ghor, of the province of Garmsír had first got into the service of the Court of Sultan Mu’izzu-d dín, at Ghazní, Afghánistán in diwán-í ‘arz, the office of petitions but got removed from there and therefore came to India proper in late 12th century and tried to get work in diwán-í ‘arz of Court of Delhi where he was again rejected for his “ungainly figure.” He kept persisting and was thus assigned the jagír of the villages of Sahlat and Sahlí (Bhagwat and Bhiuli). The income of these villages allowed him to collect a band of Khiljí tribesman who had been freeloading into India from eastern Afghánistán. The marauders were ready and much to our dismay, also fortunate.

The Magadhan territory had become very vulnerable after the fall of the Gāhadavālas and the timing for a raider could not have been better. Every new raid particularly into the district of Maner (Munír or Monghír), allowed him to gain more resources and “wealth to augment his military resources.” His plundering activities for a couple of years resulted in an ultimate full scale invasion of the country. In about 1200 C.E., with his party which included cavalry of two hundred, he invaded the Behár and caught everyone in the town off guard. The university town was ravaged, books burnt to ashes, the Śramaṇas and Brāhmaṇas were put to sword.

“According to the 15th century Tibetan chronicler Taranath, Bakhtiyar on this occassion also captured the monastery towns of Vikramasila and Nalanda and erected a fortress on the site of Uddantapur.”

He then went to the Court of Delhi, where Sultán Qutubuddín Aibak showered him with gifts, “but evidently no material reinforcements.” Next year, he planned to attack the kingdom of Senas, the territory of Gaud. Though a full scale invasion of the entire kingdom was not possible, what was possible for Bakhtíyár was the lightning raid on the residence of Sena king Lakśmaṇa Sena – Navadvípa i.e. Nadiya. In around 1203/1204 C.E, he surprised the king and reached Nadiya with barely two hundred cavalrymen. But this was just an advanced party of much larger force of ten thousand. The city was finally occupied after the entire force reached there. The town of Nadiya (Navadvípa) was destroyed and Khiljí established his government at Lakhnauti, not Nadiya. The city was destroyed and mosques and Islamic monasteries were raised.

“He brought the surrounding places into his possession, and caused his name to be read in the Khutba and struck on the coins.”

As to why Lakhnauti and not Nadiya? Well he knew his limitations – the Sena army and power was still intact and there also existed in the southwest of Bengal, the strong kingdom of Orissa. He knew it would be strain on his resources. His territory for now, only included a small portion of north Bengal. Lakśmaṇa Sena retired to Sanknat (probably Sanknat-Sankakot) not far from Ballalsena’s capital Vikrampur in Eastern Bengal and soon died but the Senas ruled there for at least, three more generations.

“Over the Rahr country (the districts west of Bhagirathi river) as well as Nadia, Hindu rule continued for the next fifty years.”

The Idea

Ambitions though very important in the life of any upstart, can also be their undoing. Bakhtíyár Khiljí got to know about the territories of Turkistán and Tibet. After making his hold strong in Bengal, within two years, his mind had started to wander around the idea to conquer Tibet. But what was the reason and motive for this sudden burst of desire to conquer such a vast land. Was it religious, pure ambition, megalomania of an invader or was the motive financial? Perhaps, all of it. We are talking about Islamic fanatics, so the religious angle is always there. The desire to bring these lands under the sword of Islam had to be attractive. But scratch the surface and another quite lucrative reason emerges. Along with the plunder of treasures of the Buddhist monasteries, the traditional trade route of Bengal that lead to the South East Asia’s gold and silver mines must have been very attractive.

“The ambition of seizing the country of Turkistán and Tibet began to torment his brain.”

Another very important lure was the trade of horses – the trade mart called Karambattan in Assam (Kumrikotah in Bhutan?) says Minháju-s Siráj, was a bustling centre of trade in horses where at the least “fifteen hundred horses were sold everyday… and all the Tangan horses which came to Lakhnauti were from here.” Karambatan was reportedly a large city with ramparts of stone and its inhabitants says Minháj were Buddhists. He also informs us that “between Kámrúpa and Tibet there are thirty five mountain passes through which horses are brought to Lakhnauti.” The connection of Tangan horses with Bengal has also been alluded by Abul Fazl. Therefore, there was quite a variety of reasons for Bakhtíyár to commence this campaign.

A view of Gyantse, Tibet

En route to Tibet

According to Minháj-us-Siráj, there were three kinds of tribes in the hills between Tibet and Lakhnauti – Kúch, Mích and Tiháru. The chief of one of the tribe, Ali Mích was evidently converted by Bakhtíyár to Islam and the chief had agreed to help him in this campaign to get to the hills. Khiljí had also asked his lieutenant Mohammad Shiran to proceed to the frontier at Lakhnor bordering the kingdom of Orissa and himself got his force ready. He thus, collected an army of almost ten thousand horses. From Lakhnauti, the guide took him to a city called Mardhan-kot or Bardhankuti (Bardhankot) and before the town, was an extremely large stream called Bangamati (Barkandi). Minháj says that it was “three times greater than the Ganges; ” some identify it with the Brahmaputra.

But it has been a little difficult to identify this river conclusively. As Habibullah writes, “no Bengal river bears that name.” He however suggests that Minháj erroneously might have “transferred the name of Rangmati (Bangmati being a likely clerical slip), an ancient place on the bend of Brahmaputra, to the Karatoya.” He goes on to say, “a recent suggestion is that Nepal river Bangmati may once have flowed as did Kosi, into Bengal and joined Karatoya.” Some scholars with good evidence support the view of Major Raverty who had lead an expedition through Sikkim into Darjeeling. He was of the opinion that the route ascended the Tista Valley and the Islamic force crossed a bridge on the Tista. After reaching this river, the army marched northwards for nearly ten days along the river, following which they crossed a stone bridge.

“For ten days, they marched on until he led them along the upper course of the river into the hills, to a place where from old times, a bridge had stood over the water having about twenty arches of stone. When army reached the bridge, Bakhtiyar posted there two officers, one a Turk, and the other a Khilji, with a large force to secure the place till his return. With the remainder of the army he then went over the bridge.”
Account of Minháju-s Siráj in The History of India as told by its Own Historians, Volume II by Elliot and Dawson

The bridge has been identified as Silsake (Silhako) bridge — “a stone dyke over the river Barnadi in the Assam Valley.” Now the Muhammadan army was in the territory of the king of Kámrúpa. He got to know through intelligence about the Tibet campaign. He sent his emissaries to inform and give a friendly warning against such a campaign. He told that they should make a retreat for now and that he himself was planning such an expedition next year in which he would even accompany them. “He would muster his forces and precede the Muhammadan Army to secure the country.” But, Muhammad ibn Bakhtíyár was in no mood to wait. He ignored all these warnings which must have been a big irritant and also an insult to the king of Kámrúpa. His guide left him on this bridge, and Bakhtíyár then proceeded towards the hills. On the bridge he had left behind a small detachment of troops along with two officers to guard it.

Reaching the Destination

After travelling for fifteen days through the defiles and various mountain passes, finally on the sixteenth day, they reached an open land – Tibet, according to some writers it was Chumbi Valley. There they found the land with flourishing villages and it was well populated. The territory also had a strong fort. The invaders quite true their character quickly started plundering the villages. The local population obviously was outraged and when the Muhammadan forces attacked the fort, they joined their hands with the defenders of the fort to give a proper retaliation to the invaders, and “inflicting heavy casualties on Bakhtíyár’s forces” in the process. The battle that ensued raged for an entire day and many of the invaders were “slain and wounded”. The defenders were lightly armed; the only weapon they used were bamboo spears and for shield, armour and helmet, they only used “raw silk strongly fastened and sewed together.” Yet, they completely overwhelmed the Islamic army.

The same evening, Bakhtíyár got the information from a captive that the very next day, they would be facing the local army heavily reinforced with a highly trained cavalry force from the city of Karambatan which included almost “three hundred and fifty thousand brave Turks, armed with bows.” The figure told at some other places is fifty thousand. Whatever be the exact strength of the incoming force, but it certainly further dampened the morale of already demoralised and defeated Mohammadan army. Bakhtíyár immediately decided to make a retreat. He had decided after consultation that they might return next year after being much more prepared. They had no idea that this campaign was to be the indirect and direct reason for the end of many amongst the invaders.

The Retreat

Bakhtíyár Khiljí was unaware that the retreat was going to be a bigger disaster than what the campaign had been until now. On their way back, the army was completely routed. Any kind of food or forage was destroyed, even the wood. Hunger was staring them in the face. The invaders had not even in their nightmares could have thought about such an ending to a campaign, much less of an army which was led by Bakhtíyár Khiljí, who hadn’t tasted defeat, until now.

“…The inhabitants of the valleys and passes had all removed far away from the road, and for a space of fifteen days, not a sir of food nor a blade of grass or fodder was to be found, and they were compelled to kill and eat their horses.”
Account of Minháju-s Siráj in The History of India as told by its Own Historians, Volume II by Elliot and Dawson

Attack by the Forces of Kamarup

The king of Kámarúpa at this time reportedly was Vishwasunder Deva (1185-1228 C.E.) alias Prithu of the Khen dynasty of Assam. He was later killed in a battle with Iltutmish’s son Nasiruddin in 1228 C.E. He was the same king who had advised to not go ahead with the campaign. As can be expected, the refusal by Bakhtíyár Khiljí was not taken lightly and therefore, when the already emaciated Islamic force reached the bridge, they found that many of its arches had been broken by the Kámarúpa forces. The officers he had left to protect the bridge probably had either quarreled amongst themselves and left or had been killed by the soldiers of Kámarúpa. There was no way that they were going to cross the river. Bakhtíyár decided to halt for sometime and by some means prepare few boats or rafts, at least something so that they can cross the river later. They decided to stay inside a temple nearby. Minháj tells us that the temple was a beautiful structure, “very lofty and strong.” When the king got to know about the situation, he quickly ordered to block the way of the Mohammadan forces out of the temple.

“He issued orders to all the Hindus of his territory to come up, levy after levy, and all around the temple they were to stick their bamboo spears in the ground and to plait them together so as to form a kind of a wall. “

The “bamboo stockade” left no means to go forward. The Islamic force still found a way out of the place but the Hindu forces pursued them to the river and covered the banks. The force of Bakhtíyár had to find a way out there to cross the river. A mounted soldier urged his horse and found it to be fordable and the entire force of the invaders followed the course. But to their dismay, the water in the stream was way too deep and almost everyone perished. From almost ten thousand strong cavalry, the strength of the force that managed to cross was too little. They were able “reach the opposite bank with only a hundred followers.” We find the evidence of this defeat of Bakhtiýar’s forces in a rock inscription dated 1127 Saka or 1206 C.E. The spot where the inscription is found is called Kanaibadasibana or Kānāi Baraśi Bowā Rock Inscription of North Guwahati. It says:

“śāke turaga yugmeśe madhumāsa trayodaśe

kāmarupaṁ samāgatya turuṣkāḥ kṣaya-māyuḥ”

The news of this reached Ali Mích and he sent his relatives to receive the utterly defeated Bakhtiýar Khiljí- “a man crushed by the weight of the disaster.” He reached Devkot, an ancient town known as Bangarh, south west of Dinajpur. This place was to be his grave.

Bakhtiyar Khilji After His Return

We come to same place now where we commenced this account in the year 1206 C.E; we come to a man sickened with grief, surrounded by depression, languishing in his own misery, who never comes out of his room lest he has to face the relatives of those who had perished. Minháj tells us that he (Bakhtiýar) used to say:

“Has any misfortune befallen Sultán Ghází Mu’ izzu-d dín Muhammad Sám that my fortune has turned so bad?”

Apparently, the Sultan was killed around the same time. It is suggested that Bakhtiýar went from bad to worse and later died from sever grief and depression but some also suggest that he was murdered. The murder story puts the blame on one Alí Mardán Khiljí who had been a chief under Bakhtiýar and had been given the district of Kuní. When Bakhtiýar was in Devkot and hadn’t seen anyone for almost three days due to his illness, Alí Mardán got to his room and killed him with a knife. Either way, the culprit of Nālandā, Vikramśilā & Uddantapurî was dead.

Conclusion

This was a man who was disheartened with a gargantuan failure – a huge dent in his image and a sorry climax to the story of his “victories” and nothing more than that. The same man had gloated on his “conquests” in the past. He had taken immense pride on invading a country, on committing wanton destruction of its monuments and its population, ravaging a flourishing civilization and had been showered with gifts and praise by his overlords for being the conqueror of the infidels. He had planned on doing something similar to another civilization across the frontiers of India in the East but its end wasn’t something he had expected. He met with strong Tibetan resistance and retreated in order to save himself and his force from even stronger defeat in their hands. But he met with even daunting prospect of hunger and the Mohammadan force was utterly routed by tour de force – the soldiers of Kámarúpa. This entire campaign became his undoing – the downfall of Ikhtiyáru-d dín Muhammad Bakhtíyár Khiljí.

References

The History of India as Told by its Own Historians by Elliot and Dawson, Volume II.
The Foundation of Muslim Rule in India by A. B. M. Habibullah.
A critical study on the formation of state and political development of ancient kamarupa from earliest time to 1228 AD by Susmita Hazarika; Chapter 6 – External Relations of Prāgjyotṣa-Kāmarūpa
Studies in Hindu and Buddhist Art, Edited by P. K. Mishra.
The Rise of Islam and The Bengal Frontier, 1204-1760 by Richard M. Eaton.
A Comprehensive History of Medieval India by Salma Ahmed Farooqui.
The River of Golden Sand by William John Gill.
The Land of Two Rivers: A History of Bengal from Mahabharata to Mujib by Nitish Sengupta.